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Abstract 
Cloud computing is one of the most important advances in computing in recent history. cybercrime has 
developed side by side and rapidly in recent years. Previous studies had confirmed the existing gap 
between cloud service providers (CSPs) and law enforcement agencies (LEAs), and LEAs cannot work 
without the cooperation of CSPs. Their relationship is influenced by legal, organisational and technical 
dimensions, which affect the investigations. Therefore, it is essential to enhance the cloud forensics 
relationship between LEAs and CSPs. This research addresses the need for a unified collaborative model 
to facilitate proper investigations and explore and evaluate existing different models involved in the 
relationship between Omani LEAs and local CSPs as a participant in investigations. Further, it proposes 
a validated research instrument that can be cloud forensics survey. It can also be used as an evaluation 
tool to identify, measure, and manage cloud forensic investigations.  
Keywords Cloud Forensics, Incident Response, Law Enforcement Agents, Cloud Service Providers, 
Cloud Forensics Readiness, construct, instrument, survey, reliability, validity. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Cloud computing has become a revolution in the technology world, and both individuals and institutions 
are using cloud services and becoming dependent on it. By replacing old systems to cloud services, 
organisations can save time and cost (Al-Gharibi 2019b). Gartner expects cloud services to exceed $300 
billion by 2021 (Gartner 2018). Governments are now turning to the application of cloud computing for 
the delivery of their systems and services. Due to this emerging technology, most of the current digital 
crime forensic cases have moved from local device storage to the cloud, including smart devices 
connected to cloud environments. The result of this change is seen in the daunting challenges that Law 
Enforcement faces when conducting investigations involving data stored in the cloud. Hence, Digital 
Forensics (DF) had a new specialisation named as "Cloud Forensics (CF)”. 
The challenges have become bigger for law enforcement with cloud forensics investigations, where LEAs 
cannot work without the cooperation of CSPs. The relationship between LEAs and CSPs is overwhelmed 
by many challenges, in the legal, organisational and technical levels, which negatively affect the 
cooperation between the two organisations (Al Husaini 2018b; Dykstra 2013; Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; 
NIST 2014; Ruan & Carthy 2012; Ruan et al. 2013; Ruan et al. 2011) 
This problem is not trivial because LEAs cannot work without the cooperation of CSPs. Their 
relationship does not have one challenge that can be addressed solely by organisational level, in facts, 
the organisational, legal and technical challenges are interlinked. Based on the literature review, there 
is no previous studies on this relationship. For this reason, this study focuses on the current situation of 
cloud forensics in Oman as a case study and seek to understand the existing relationship between Omani 
LEAs and local CSPs by answering the research question: What are the factors that impact upon the 
relationship between Omani LEAs and local CSPs? 
A survey is designed to contribute in answering the research question, this paper aims is to propose a 
validated research instrument for this survey. It can also be used as an evaluation tool to identify, 
measure, and manage cloud forensics investigations relationship. Implications of the study suggest a 
need for rigorous research to understand this relationship and how it affects the path of real-world 
digital forensic cases. 
The remaining of this paper subsections cover a literature review of cloud, digital forensics, digital 
forensics in Oman and cloud forensics. In section two we introduce and discuss existing Cloud Forensics 
Readiness (CFR) models and relevant standards and, in section three we explore the conceptual 
framework and hypotheses. Section four discusses the research methodology, and finally, we share the 
result and conclusions. 
1.1 Digital Forensics 
The prime purpose of Digital Forensics is to facilitate the reconstruction of events and actions which are 
found to be criminal or helping to anticipate any malicious actions shown to be troublesome to planned 
operations. Therefore, the credibility of digital evidence is at the core of the digital forensic process 
because it is the means by which a forensic conclusion is either accepted or rejected (Selamat, Yusof & 
Sahib 2008). 
Despite many assertions by researchers about the importance of an international standard for digital 
forensics (Al Husaini 2018a; Du, Le-Khac & Scanlon 2017; Kohn, Eloff & Eloff 2013; Reith, Carr & 
Gunsch 2002), there are several standards such as the ISO standards(ISO 27037 2012; ISO/27043 2015) 
academic, UK and US standards (UK: Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Good Practice Guide 
for Digital Evidence(Williams 2012),  US: “Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for First 
Responders”(Ballou 2010)) 
However, these are generic guidelines to deal with digital evidence and each suggests different phases 
and processes, which leads to the different countries develop their own operational level to comply with 
local procedures, policies, and principles in a given country.  
1.2 Digital Forensics in OMAN 
Oman established the National Digital Forensics Lab (NDFL), which was opened in February 2016 
(MuscatDaily 2016; Times_Of_Oman 2016). One year later in 2017, it obtained international 
accreditation by the ANSI-ASQ National Accreditation Board (ANAB). This laboratory is used to collect 
evidence and to assist LEAs and judicial authorities with investigating these crimes. 
In Oman, more than 2,800 phone calls and over 420 e-mails were registered to report about cybercrimes 
by the end of 2016, which required the intervention of the NDFL. In 2017, the NDFL handled 172 DF 
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cases involving 877 evidence devices including computers, mobile, phones, external hard disk and USBs, 
which resulted from cybercrime cases in Oman (Ras & Venter 2015). 
1.3 Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing cannot be considered a new technological term, but just in 2007 only cloud computing 
was introduced to the public, after the announcement of Google and IBM cooperation in cloud 
technologies (A Vouk 2008; Alenezi et al. 2017). Gartner predicts cloud services around the world to 
grow in 2018 to more than $ 186 billion, an increase of 21.4 per cent from 2017, as it is expected to 
exceed $ 300 billion by 2021 (Gartner 2018). Cloud computing has been defended by NIST as “Model 
for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable 
computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly 
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction” (Mell & 
Grance 2011). 
Despite all the benefits of cloud computing, shifting to the cloud is a challenge and the cloud computing 
invite vulnerabilities that can be used in cybercrime (Al-Gharibi 2018). Although there are security risks 
involved, the public and private sectors have chosen to adopt cloud computing. For example, in 
government, they approach cloud services implementation. These include commercial cloud services, 
government cloud services developed by the government, and government cloud services developed by 
private companies (Al-Gharibi 2019a). 
1.4 Cloud Forensics 
Previous researchers have published numerous papers on cloud forensic with great interest in cloud 
computing. However, despite all this research, no solutions were found to address the cloud forensics 
challenges (Zhao & Duncan 2018). 
Many researchers argue that the challenges of cloud forensics cannot be solved through technology alone 
because there are regulatory and legal principles that must be solved side by side (De Marco 2015). 
Numerous challenges that need to be solved in all these areas, many academic, technical, regulatory and 
legal researchers have begun to discuss these challenges, such as trustworthiness, acountablity, and  
Lack of international agreements & laws  (Al Husaini 2018c; Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; Mell & Grance 
2014).  
The term of the cloud forensics is relatively new. The first researcher presented this term in 2011 (Ruan 
et al. 2011) (Alenezi et al. 2017), who introduced organisational, technical and legal cloud forensics 
challenges. NIST has defended cloud computing as "Cloud computing forensics science is the application 
of scientific principles, technological practices and derived and proven methods to reconstruct past 
cloud computing events through identification, collection, preservation, examination, interpretation 
and reporting of digital evidence" (Mell & Grance 2014). 
2 PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Cloud forensics readiness has been well studied by many researchers (Ab Rahman et al. 2016; Alenezi 
et al. 2017; Elyas et al. 2014; Grobler, Louwrens & von Solms 2010; ISO/27043 2015; Kebande & Venter 
2014; Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; Makutsoane & Leonard 2014; Moussa, Ithnin & Miaikil 2014; NIST 
2014; Sibiya et al. 2013; Trenwith & Venter 2013; Valjarevic & Venter 2013). A theoretical framework 
was proposed with some suggested technical solutions which will be reviewed below: 
The NIST Cloud Computing Forensic Science Working Group (NCC FSWG)(Mell & Grance 2014) is one 
of the most critical reports that highlight the challenges and problems of cloud forensics. However, the 
report is relatively outdated, as the NCC FSWG has not issued any other report in this area, and it might 
be due to the lack of financial support for the group. Yet it is the most detailed and comprehensive 
comparison to other papers so far. 
Another excellent report related to cloud forensic was published in 2016 by European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA), which came under the title "Exploring Cloud Incidents" It 
provides an overview of the current state of cloud forensic and the incident response, and identifying 
and analysing the current technical, legislative, organisational challenges (Liveri & Skouloudi 2016). 
One of the CFR models is of interest by implementing a Botnet solution for monitoring the cloud 
environment and providing acceptable digital evidence that can be used within the courts, which is 
proposed by (Kebande & Venter 2014), yet this model needed to be standardised to integrate with other 
cloud processes. Another forensics readiness model which could be used by CSPs as a technique for DFR, 
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which can help CSPs to control evidence is required for investigations. However the range of this 
framework is restricted to data examination in forensic analysis within the cloud infrastructure (Sibiya 
et al. 2013).  
Remote access / central to the investigator to the cloud computing it was one of the proposed models 
for CFR by (Trenwith & Venter 2013), which could support digital forensics investigators to do their 
work.    
A conceptual model for immigrating the organisations to the cloud environment suggested by 
(Makutsoane & Leonard 2014), the idea was to define the status of readiness of CSPs. The proposed 
model, which involves a process tool, allows organisations to create the right decision and choose the 
suitable CSP. Highlighting the requirements of cloud forensics, the authors used a non Malicious Botnet 
to measure forensic readiness. Those suggested requirements include technical, operational and legal 
aspects based on the (ISO/27043 2015) standard. Once again the requirements need to be ascertained 
and tested to ensure the performance is not only effective but can be a standard to which all forensic 
investigations are conducted and will continue to evolve with future technologies (Kebande & Venter 
2016). A conceptual framework which is detected to help laaS users activate forensics readiness. The 
framework shows how IaaS users can get potential digital evidence without depending on CSPs. This 
model includes nine elements, containing the technical, legal and organisational forensics readiness core 
values (Moussa, Ithnin & Miaikil 2014). 
A forensics-by-design framework for Cyber-Physical Cloud Systems (CPCS) suggested by (Ab Rahman 
et al. 2016),  where they are highlighting the significance of forensic readiness. It contains six elements 
and assures us that a CPCS can be intended for facilitating forensic investigations. This framework can 
help investigators and accelerate forensic investigations. CFR framework by highlighting the factors 
affecting CFR technical, legal and regulatory (Alenezi et al. 2017). 
According to the previous literature review, there are concerns and lack of confidence that the CSPs will 
be the first to respond to an incident. There is a consensus amongst researchers that there are gaps and 
conflict of interest between CSPs and LEAs. 
In this study, we will highlight the relationship between LEAs and CSPs and classify the essential factors 
to be understood in order to enhance and organise the relationship. 
3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
There is a broad consensus among researchers (Almulla, Iraqi & Jones 2014; Alqahtany et al. 2017; 
Grispos, Storer & Glisson 2013; Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; Mell & Grance 2011; Ruan et al. 2011; Zhang, 
Wang & Han 2014) that the CSPs should cooperate with LEAs to make successful forensic investigations 
into cloud computing, as all powers are with the CSPs, and LEAs cannot operate without the cooperation 
of the CSPs. Although there is consensus on the importance of CSPs cooperation with LEAs, there is still 
no research study to highlight this relationship and identify the factors that need to be understood in 
order to enhance and streamline the relationship.  
For effective cloud forensic investigations, three main dimensions consisting of seven factors were 
proposed as shown in Figure 1. These three dimensions are based on institutional theory, which is 
regulative, normative, and cognitive. A detailed discussion of the seven factors (trustworthiness, 
segregation of duties, standards, laws and regulations, readiness, accountability, technology 
compatibility) is also presented.  
Figure 1 illustrates the overlap between the functions of LEAs and CSPs. We note the gap in the middle 
of the overlapped area. This gap has been confirmed by some researchers (Almulla, Iraqi & Jones 2014; 
Alqahtany et al. 2017; Grispos, Storer & Glisson 2013; Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; Ruan et al. 2011; Zhang, 
Wang & Han 2014). 
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Figure 1 Conceptual Framework for a Collaborative Cloud Forensic Investigations 
Figure 1 also shows a conceptual framework to analyse the critical factors for the relationship between 
CSPs and LEAs. There are seven hypotheses (H1-H7) as given below:  
H1: Laws and regulations have a critical impact on the relationship between CSPs and LEAs. 
H2: The segregation of duties has a critical impact on the relationship between CSPs and LEAs. 
H3: Accountability has a critical impact on the relationship between CSPs and LEAs. 
H4: The SOPs & Standards have a critical impact on the relationship between CSPs and LEAs. 
H5: Readiness has a critical impact on the relationship between CSPs and LEAs. 
H6: The trustworthiness of CSPs has a critical impact on the relationship between CSPs and LEAs. 
H7: The technology compatibility of CSPs has a critical impact on the relationship with LEAs. 
4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
For the experimental evaluation of the presented hypotheses and proposed model, we developed a 
survey instrument, which is to achieve the correctness and accuracy of the tool, and reduce the 
measurement error based on the previous guidelines that have been developed in the literature 
(Aladalah, Cheung & Lee 2016; Lewis, Templeton & Byrd 2005; MacKenzie, Podsakoff & Podsakoff 2011; 
Moore & Benbasat 1991).  
This survey will help to test and confirm the factors suggested in the hypothesis. This will lead to 
understand relationship between the LEAs and CSPs. We validated the instrument as summarised in 
Table 1.  
Phase  Description  
Construct 
definition   
Constructs definition were derived from a variety of sources including pre-existing definitions, 
and mostly prior relevant literature reviews.  
Item generation  Scales were adopted from relevant literature when possible. Items were developed for other constructs Appendix 1.  
Expertise 
Feedback  
The draft survey was sent to academic and experts in the field, three senior academic and three 
amendments were made to the items. Four expertise from the industry, law enforcement 
agency and local cloud service providers.  
Q-sorting  Qualtrics Q-sorting was used, where participants were asked to drag and drop random items 
inside boxes displaying factors. A two-stage examination was performed to improve reliability 
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Phase  Description  
and validity. Practical experience has been taken into account and it was that participants 
must not have less than 5 years of experience. Also, their educational level must not be less 
than master degree for practitioners, and a PhD for academics. Two academics with practical 
experience in digital forensics and two experts in digital forensics from industry, two 
practitioners at each stage, resulting in modifications in the formulation of several items 
(Appendix 1). 
Pre-testing  To enhance reliability and validity, two academics completed the initial questionnaire. There 
was a slight change in length, structure, wording of the Questionnaire.  
Pilot test  7 law enforcement agencies, cloud services providers, academics, professionals in the field finished the survey. There was a minor change were made based on their feedback. 
Table 1. Instrument development process  
4.1 Conceptualization and Operationalization   
Following to the conceptual definition of the whole constructs, which has been operationalised using 
validated items from previous related studies. We then validated the measures and adjusted those items 
to fit the LEAs & CSPs relationship context. The scales have been developed for some items by following 
the development guidelines using the existing literature (Lewis, Templeton & Byrd 2005). In order to 
assure the validity and reliability of the instrument (Neuman 2011), and to verify that the participants 
have sufficiently understood the items, multi indicators have been used. Maintaining the short measure 
is effective to reduce the response bias caused by boredom or fatigue. Harvey, Billings and Nilan (1985) 
recommended to evaluate the homogeneity of items at each latent construct, which requires at least four 
items for each scale. The final survey consists of four items or more to all factors. The final measures are 
given in Appendix 1.  
4.2 Q-sorting   
Q-Sorting is one technique utilised to evaluate the reliability and validity of survey measurements 
developed for the questionnaire (Nahm et al. 2002). The goal of the Q-sorting is to test the items 
empirically to decide whether each item in the survey represents the corresponding factor (Lewis, 
Templeton & Byrd 2005). The method involves two different stages, each stage consisted of different 
pairs of judges. Two participants were digital forensics academics, other two were digital forensics 
experts from the industry. Participants were grouped in pairs, an academic and a practitioner in each 
round. Judges were not allowed to any cooperation among them. On the other hand, they have the right 
to ask anything relevant to the Q-sorting procedures (Brown 1996). To evaluate and assess the 
measurement validity and reliability, the inter-judge agreement level was calculated by Cohen’s Kappa 
Index (Cohen 1960) and the hit ratio (Moore & Benbasat 1991), both have been used as evaluation 
criteria in order to evaluate the measurement reliability and validity. Regarding Kappa, there are no 
general agreement exists, but several scholars recommended the following: rates from (.76 -1.00) are 
considered to be excellent agreement, rates from (.40 - .75) are considered to be fair to moderate 
agreement, and rates from (.39 or less) are considered poor agreement (Landis & Koch 1977). According 
to hit ratio, the higher the percentage of items placed in the correct construct, the higher the degree of 
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Table 2. First sorting stage  
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In the first stage, a pool of 39 items was presented randomly, and each judge was present with 7 factors 
and 39 items and was asked to drag and drop them into the factor boxes. “Not Applicable” box has been 
added to guarantee the judges’ freedom to decide, thereby not pushing them into a particular box. In 
this round, two judges agreed on 32 out of 39 items; an average “hit ratio” of 79 percent was attained as 
61 out of 78 items were correctly classified as shown in Table 2. The first sorting round resulted in a 
rewording of the ambiguous items, and also the deletion of undetermined items. Exactly 3 items have 
been deleted, and 6 items have been reworded. Table 3 presents the round 2 of the Q-sorting.  








Construct  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N/A  Total  Hits  
1 10               10 100% 
2 1 13            14 93% 
3     10 1        1 12 90% 
4     1 7         8 88% 
5         9 1     10 90% 
6           8     8 100% 
7            8  8 100% 
Total items placement:   70 Number of hits:  65   93% Overall hit ratio:  
Table 3. Second sorting stage  
The phase two of Q-sorting presented 35 items for the constructs. Two judges agreed on 33 out of the 35 
items with a hit ratio of 93 percent, almost 14 percentage improvement compared to phase one, as 65 of 
70 items were accurately categorised as shown in Table 3. Whereas, the calculated Kappas yielded values 
is above 0.90. Following Landis and Koch (1977) guidelines for acceptable levels for Cohen’s Kappa 
Index, which is considered above 0.76 as an excellent agreement level, we decided to end the Q-Sorting, 
with average placement ratio of 93%, which confirmed a high level of reliability and construct validity. 
Overall, the methods utilised are deemed as adequate in meeting the content validity, and the 
instrument is ready for the next phase. 
4.3 Pilot test   
The goal of this phase is to evaluate the items and the general format. As the final sample for this research 
is limited to Omani expertise in the field, this phase involved 8 digital forensics expertise, cloud servers 
providers and academics researchers. Pilot test participants were asked to fill the survey and then gives 
feedback on the level of difficulty in completing the survey. The survey investigated the proposed model 
constructs on a 5 point Likert (1932) started from ‘Very Important’ to ‘Not at all important’. Moreover, 
the pilot test participants have been asked to gives their suggestions for any improvement. The final 
outcome of this phase has improved the quality of the survey, and presented to the final draft of the 
survey.  
5 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
5.1 Initial reliability   
In order to evaluate the initial reliability of the instrument, we calculate the Barlett’s Test of Sphericity  
and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy. The correlation matrix unveiled the 
presence of several coefficients as 0.3 and above. This was considered high enough to guarantee that the 
engaged items were adequate measures of the factors. The rate of Bartlett's test of sphericity is 
statistically significant (p-value <.000) fortifying the statistical correlation between the above-
mentioned variables. Those measures show the appropriateness of data for the need for handling factor 
analysis and presented evidence of initial reliability. 
5.2 Construct validity   
Factor validity is revealed by analysing its indicators relationship with other factors, both associated 
(i.e., convergent validity) and unassociated (i.e., discriminant validity) (Pallant 2011). Hair et al. (2006) 
suggested that the evidence of convergent validity is confirmed If the indicators load strongly on their 
associated constructs (p>.50). In addition, the factors must be tested in order to discriminant validity, 
which could be achieved if the indicators are different from other unassociated indicators and load 
stronger on their associated factors than on any other factors. Items which have loadings under the 
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threshold must be dropped from the final instrument. Moreover, items loading on multiple factors must 
be dropped also. Nonetheless, Lewis, Templeton and Byrd (2005) recommended that subjective 
judgement must be applied, so that items with strongly justified theoretical relevance are not lost in the 
process. essential element analysis with Varimax rotation has been used to evaluate the validity of the 
instrument. The final instrument of 33 items representing 7 separate factors which have been tested in 
order to check the robustness of the measurement. The factor analysis showed a logical grouping with 
the identified constructs, ensuring the accuracy of the proposed constructs. All the 33 items have 
loadings on their related constructs over the cut-off of 0.50, thereby confirming convergent validity. 
Furthermore, all items load stronger on their associated construct than on other constructs, suggesting 
good discriminant validity. Thus, the outcomes show that factors can be applied to evaluate the 
conceptual research model and hypotheses.  
5.3 Final reliability  
According to  Hair et al. (2006), Cronbach’s alpha is commonly used to measure the reliability with a 
range from 0 (totally unreliable) to 1 (completely reliable). An alpha statistic of 0.60 to 0.70 is considered 
to be the lower limit of acceptability and sufficient for exploratory research, but 0.8 or higher is 
inevitably more desirable, and beyond .90 could pose a problem of multicollinearity(Nunnally & 
Bernstein 1967). The reliability test has been conducted during the pilot study data to evaluate the 
internal consistency of every group of items for each factor. The reliability function of the Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) has been used to calculate Cronbach’s alpha. The outcomes 
present that the reliability of the factors range from .79 to .93, which shows statistically significant 
results because they fall within the recommended rates. Consequently, factor reliabilities are considered 
to be sufficient.  
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This research seeks to study the challenges of cloud forensics and to highlight the relationship between 
Omani LEAs and Local CSPs. A wide range of existing research in CFR has a framework and prototype 
for solutions was quantified. However, as previous literature has shown, there is a knowledge gap in the 
relationship between the CSPs and LEAs in cloud forensics from a legal and technical perspective, the 
research highlights the importance of this relationship in order to achieve a high level of readiness, 
segregation of duties and responsibility. 
To achieve the objectives, the researcher will use an interpretive qualitative case study approach, and 
the relationship between the CSPs and LEAs will be investigated. This research is expected to contribute 
to the body of knowledge of cloud forensics as the development of new theory, and a practical 
contribution is expected, where new insights and vision to decision and policymakers, CSPs and LEAs 
to improve this relationship. 
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Appendix 1 : List of measurement items 
Construct No Survey Items Reference 
SOPs & Standards 
SS1 Procedures, model or framework for cloud forensic investigations. (Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; 
NIST 2014; Ruan et al. 
2013) 
SS2 best practices for cloud forensic investigations  (Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; 
NIST 2014) 
SS3 A guideline on cooperation between CSPs and LEAs, in cases of an 
cloud forensics investigation. 
(Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; 
NIST 2014; Ruan et al. 
2013) 
SS4 An agreement on the recording of the chain of custody among all 
parties in an investigation. 
(NIST 2014; Ruan et al. 
2013) 
SS5 An agreement and guideline on preparing cloud forensic reports to 
ensure standard format. 
(Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; 
Ruan et al. 2013) 
Readiness 
R1 Cloud forensic readiness with LEAs. (Liveri & Skouloudi 2016) 
R2 Cloud forensic readiness with CSPs. (Liveri & Skouloudi 2016) 
R3 Conducting plans and possible scenarios,  (Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; 
NIST 2014) 
R4 Test and verify tools (hardware and software) used in cloud forensics 
investigations. 
(NIST 2014) 
R5 A policy in the CSPs to reinforce the proactive cloud forensics and 
ensure all procedures are performed in a standard fashion. 
(Ruan et al. 2013) 
R6 Digital forensics staff in the LEAs provided with up-to-date training on 
cloud forensic knowledge. 
(Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; 
NIST 2014) 
Accountability 
A1 Accountability of organisations actions and roles in cloud forensics 
investigations. 
(Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; 
NIST 2014) 
A2 Accountability of individuals' actions and roles towards cloud forensics 
investigations. 
(Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; 
NIST 2014) 
A3 The enforcement of cloud forensics investigations standards and 
procedures across the organization 
(NIST 2014) 
A4 The appropriateness of specific sanctions in violating cloud forensics 
investigations standards 
(Al-Kalbani 2017) 
A5 Severity of violation of the Cloud Forensics investigations (Legal 




SD1 An agreement on the division of responsibilities  (Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; 
NIST 2014) 
SD2 Segregation of duties to avoid the conflict of interest and overlap 
between the functions of LEAs and CSPs. 
(Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; 
NIST 2014) 
SD3 Understand ability and clarity of the cloud forensics investigations  
Standards and procedures 
(NIST 2014) 
SD4 The clarity of employees’ roles and responsibilities towards cloud 
forensics investigations 
(Al-Kalbani 2017) 
Laws & Regulations 
LR1 Laws or regulations governing the work of cloud service providers 
CSP. 
(Ruan et al. 2013) 
LR2 Laws or regulations cover aspects of Cloud Forensics investigations. (Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; 
NIST 2014; Ruan et al. 
2013) 
LR3 Service Level Agreement (SLA), should be covering the cloud forensics 
terms such as tools, supported technologies, and access granted 
regarding forensic investigation. 
(Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; 
NIST 2014; Ruan et al. 
2013) 
LR4 Encourage and participate in international conventions to facilitate 
access to an exchange of evidence during cloud forensics investigations 
with International level. 
(Liveri & Skouloudi 2016; 
NIST 2014; Ruan et al. 
2013) 
LR5 Consult the legal experts in CSPs or externally, in multi-jurisdiction/ 
multi-tenant cases in relation to forensic investigations. 
(NIST 2014) 
Trustworthiness 
T1 The Team of the first responder at CSPs should be well trained and 
certified in cloud forensics on how to handle and maintain digital 
evidence? 
(NIST 2014; Ruan et al. 
2013) 
T2 Continuity of business and services are the top priorities for CSPs (NIST 2014) 
T3 Functionality of digital forensics in satisfying the cloud forensics 
investigations requirements 
(Al-Kalbani 2017; NIST 
2014) 





TC1 The appropriateness of technical requirements for satisfying cloud 
forensic standards 
(Al-Kalbani 2017; Ruan et 
al. 2013) 
TC2 Standardization of cloud forensic technologies (Al-Kalbani 2017; NIST 
2014) 
TC3 Interoperability of cloud forensic technologies with operational 
technologies 
(Al-Kalbani 2017) 
TC4 Perceived impact in terms of technical burdens and cost (Al-Kalbani 2017) 
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